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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Alan O. Sykes*  
 
 The economic study of human rights is a potentially vast subject. Its breadth 
results in part from the wide array of “human rights” now said to exist—all manner of 
economic rights, labor rights, cultural rights, civil and political rights, rights to a clean 
environment, and perhaps others.1 The set of economic questions that one might ask 
about each “right” is also extensive. For example, is the right in question efficient (do 
those who benefit from it gain enough to be able to compensate those who lose) or is it 
redistributive? What can one say about the political economy of the right—how do we 
explain which rights are recognized under national and international law and which 
potential rights are not, and how do we explain the emergence of particular rights over 
time? What is the function of international human rights treaties, especially when many 
of them merely bind nations to do what they would do anyway? What is the relationship 
between human rights and economic development?  These are but a subset of the possible 
lines of economic inquiry, and of course they intersect considerably with the work of 
political science. 
 As an initial foray into the economics of human rights, I focus on the relationship 
between international trade and human rights, and particularly the relationship between 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and human rights.2 The emphasis is on the 
arguments of WTO critics who suggest that the growth of the WTO is in one manner or 
                                                 
* Frank & Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This essay was prepared for 
the World Trade Forum at the University of Bern. I thank Mike Mullican for excellent research assistance. 
1 The central instruments under international law are the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), bifurcated into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Other UN conventions pertain 
to such matters as torture and genocide, racial discrimination, and rights of the child. Regional conventions 
also exist. See generally Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia 1990). 
2There is a substantial literature on this general subject, though relatively little of it is expressly 
economic. For some recent contributions, see Jeffrey Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights, 
25 Brooklyn L.J. 125 (1999); Frank Garcia, Trading Away the Human Rights Principle, 25 Brooklyn L.J. 
51 (1999); Mark Warner, Globalization and Human Rights: An Economic Model, 25 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 
99 (1999); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: 
The Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 3 (2001). 
 
 another a threat to human rights. These arguments include the following:3 (i) The 
admission to the WTO of nations that violate human rights extinguishes opportunities for 
valuable sanctions to discourage such violations. (China is the usual focus of this 
concern.) (ii) Open trade causes production to relocate to areas where environmental 
standards are lax and results in environmental degradation. Likewise, the competitive 
pressures that result from open trade cause regulators to lose control over local regulatory 
matters and precipitate a race to the bottom over matters such as social welfare standards, 
environmental standards, and worker protection legislation. (iii) Open trade exacerbates 
inequality in the distribution of income. 
 Although none of these arguments should be dismissed out of hand, I will suggest 
that none of them are terribly persuasive objections to more open trade under the auspices 
of the WTO. To the contrary, a more open trading system generally tends to promote 
most of the concerns that come under the rubric of human rights. And to the extent that 
exceptions arise, conventional economic arguments regarding optimal policy instruments 
strongly counsel against curtailment of open trade as a solution, and instead argue for 
tailored measures that directly address the issue in question.  I will develop these themes 
in general terms in Sections I and II, and then deal with the arguments more specifically 
in Section III. 
 Section III also briefly addresses a narrower issue that has received considerable 
attention lately—whether the TRIPS agreement collides with human rights by making 
essential medicines unaffordable in developing countries. On that issue, the economic 
response is rather more agnostic, but it is important to underscore the fact that credible 
patent rights for pharmaceuticals in developing economies may be essential to any 
progress in the treatment of tropical diseases. 
 
I. Human Rights as a “Normal Good” 
 Jokes about economists often build on the notion that economists rarely agree 
with each other. Yet, there is at least one proposition on which virtually all economists 
agree—trade liberalization raises living standards in the aggregate. As Paul Samuelson 
once put it: “[T]here is essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is 
                                                 
3Here I paraphrase the arguments set forth in Human Rights and International Trade: Narrative Project 
Description, the proposal that forms the basis for this project. 
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 an exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a mutually profitable division 
of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national product of all nations, and makes 
possible higher standards of living all over the globe.”4 The central agenda of the WTO, 
of course, is trade liberalization. As WTO membership expands and trade barriers decline 
over time, therefore, the result will tend to be an increase in the real national product of 
member nations.5 This proposition is not merely theoretical—empirical research 
generally confirms that more open trading systems experience higher rates of economic 
growth.6  
 In turn, the growth in real income that results from more open trade will promote 
human rights to the degree that the demand for human rights is likely “income elastic.” 
There are good reasons to believe that this will be true for many rights. Note that almost 
all human rights are, in one manner or another, costly. The protection of rights generally 
requires a legal system that is effective and credible, and such systems do not come free. 
Moreover, many rights require some additional sacrifice of other human wants—
minimum wages, rights to unionize, environmental standards, and social security 
systems, for example, all come at the price of an increase in the cost of goods and 
services, or an increase in taxation. At some level, therefore, human rights must be 
“financed” by a reduction in other consumption expenditures that would be made in their 
absence. Human rights are in this sense akin to ordinary goods and services—they cost 
money, and because of the budget constraint that all individuals and societies ultimately 
face, an increase in “expenditures” on human rights must be accompanied by a decrease 
in expenditures on other things that people desire. 
 The expenditures necessary to create and enforce human rights will tend to be less 
burdensome, other things being equal, in wealthier societies. For in such societies, basic 
human needs for food, clothing, shelter and the like are more likely to have been met, and 
more resources will be available for other things.  We might therefore expect that 
wealthier societies will tend to expend more resources (proportionally) on the creation 
                                                 
4Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 692 (9th ed. 1973). 
5Some caveats must be noted. For example, the growth of regional trading arrangements raises the 
danger of “trade diversion” which could lower real global output if severe enough.  Similarly, some WTO 
rules pertain to matters other than trade liberalization. The rules on intellectual property protection 
contained in TRIPS, in particular, have an uncertain impact on global output. 
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 and protection of human rights7—that is, we might expect that human rights will tend to 
be “normal goods” in the language of economics.8 Anecdotal evidence hints at the 
correctness of this hypothesis. I suspect that most readers will concur that more 
developed nations tend to have stronger guarantees of worker rights, higher minimum 
wages, and greater restrictions on child labor; more developed nations tend to have 
stronger safety net programs; more developed nations tend to impose greater restrictions 
on activities that degrade the environment; more developed nations tend to have stronger 
anti-discrimination norms, more developed nations tend to have stronger protections for 
the rights of the accused, and so on. 
 Yet another mechanism may exist to create a favorable linkage between openness 
to trade and human rights. Openness to trade likely begets a higher rate of interchange of 
ideas and information between countries. In turn, as people in nations with fewer rights 
and freedoms become aware of conditions elsewhere, internal pressures for improvement 
may grow. Isolated societies, by contrast, may be more subject to human rights abuses. 
 But we need not rely on anecdotes and casual empiricism to believe that rising 
real incomes and greater openness to trade tends to promote human rights—these 
tendencies can be seen in empirical data. I assembled per capita GDP data for 195 
countries,9 along with data from third-party sources regarding the quality of human rights 
country-by-country. I include the so-called “Humana rating” from the 1991 World 
Human Rights Guide (higher ratings reflect better human rights conditions),10 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
6See Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and The Process of Global Integration, 1995 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1; Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity and Growth: What 
Do We Really Know?, 108 Econ. J. 447 (1998). 
7The notion that rights will tend to receive greater protection in wealthier societies is among the 
themes developed in Richard Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe -- 
and for the United States, 32 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1996). 
8A normal good is defined as a good for which the demand rises as income rises. 
9Data were drawn from CIA World Factbook 2000, available online at  
www.ocdi.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
10Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 3d ed. (Oxford: 1992). 
The 40 criteria used in rating each country were distilled from various UN conventions and 
international treaties. The percentage ratings were determined by awarding a number of points for each 
question: 
3 points if there is an unqualified respect for the freedom or right 
2 points if there are occasional breaches of respect for the freedom or right 
1 point if there are frequent violations of the freedom or right 
0 points if there is a constant pattern of violation of the freedom or right 
Questions 7-13 were weighted more heavily because they involve a greater degree of physical 
suffering. The rating was reached by adding the total points for nonweighted questions to the total for the 
4 
 Freedom House ratings on both political rights and civil liberties from its 1999-2000 
survey (lower ratings reflect better human rights conditions),11 and the Index of 
                                                                                                                                                 
weighted questions, multiplying by 100, and dividing by 162, the total number of points possible. The 
average score was 62%. 
The forty criteria are: 
Freedom to: 
1. Travel in own country; 
2. Travel outside of own country 
3. Peacefully associate and assemble 
4. Teach ideas and receive information 
5. Monitor human rights violations 
6. Publish and educate in an ethnic language 
Freedom from: 
7. Serfdom, slavery, forced or child labor 
8. Extrajudicial killings or “disappearances” 
9. Torture or coercion by the state 
10. Compulsory work permits or conscription of labor 
11. Capital punishment by the state 
12. Court sentences of corporal punishment 
13. Indefinite detention without charge 
14. Compulsory membership of state organizations or parties 
15. Compulsory religion or state ideology in schools 
16. Deliberate state policies to control artistic works 
17. Political censorship of press 
18. Censorship of mail or telephone tapping 
Freedom for or rights to: 
19. Peaceful political opposition 
20. Multiparty elections by secret and universal ballot 
21. Political and legal equality for women 
22. Social and economic equality for women 
23. Social and economic equality for ethnic minorities 
24. Independent newspapers 
25. Independent book publishing 
26. Independent radio and TV networks 
27. All courts to total independence 
28. Independent trade unions 
Legal rights: 
29. From deprivation of nationality 
30. To be considered innocent until proven guilty 
31. To free legal aid when necessary and counsel of own choice 
32. From civilian trials in secret 
33. To be brought promptly before a judge or court 
34. From police searches of home without a warrant 
35. From arbitrary seizure of personal property 
Personal rights: 
36. To interracial, interreligious or civil marriage 
37. Equality of sexes during marriage and for divorce proceedings 
38. To practice any religion 
39. To use contraceptive pills and devices 
40. To noninterference by state in strictly private affairs 
11Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1999-2000, 
Adrian Karatnycky ed. (Freedom House: 2000). 
Political rights and civil liberties were each rated by Freedom House on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being 
the most free and 7 being the least free. Countries were assigned a particular number based on responses to 
5 
                                                                                                                                                  
the checklists below and the judgments of the survey team at Freedom House. The team assigned initial 
ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the comparative 
rights or liberties present; the only exception is the additional discretionary question B in the political 
rights checklist, for which 1 to 4 raw points were subtracted, depending on the severity of the situation. 
After placing countries in initial categories based on the checklist points, the team made adjustments for 
factors like extreme violence, whose intensity might not be reflected in the checklist questions. The factors 
considered in each category are: 
Political rights: enable people to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by 
which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the 
national, regional, or local community. In a free society, this represents the right of all adults to vote and 
compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. 
Checklist for political rights: 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and 
fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation 
of ballots? 
4. Are the voters able to endow their elected representatives with real power? 
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political 
groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or 
groupings 
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a possibility for the 
opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 
hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-
government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making 
process? 
Additional discretionary Political Rights questions: A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties 
or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of 
policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler? B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately 
changing the ethnic composition of country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance 
in favor of another group? 
Civil liberties: freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state. 
Checklist for Civil Liberties: 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases 
where the media are state-controlled, but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the 
system credit.) 
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression? 
3. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
4. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Notre: this includes political parties, 
civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.) 
5. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective 
collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations? 
6. Is there an independent judiciary? 
7. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under 
the law? Are police under direct civilian control? 
9. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, whether by groups that support 
or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and 
insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does 
not in and of itself make a not free society free.) 
10. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
11. Is there open and free private discussion 
12. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of 
employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state? 
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 Economic Freedom Rating for 2000 prepared by the Wall Street Journal (lower ratings 
reflect better economic freedom conditions).12 Finally, on the theory that the overall 
quality of human rights in a nation is likely correlated with the degree to which people 
want to migrate into the nation (or exit from it), I include data on net migration rates as 
well (migrants per 1,000 population, a positive rate indicates a net influx of migrants).13 
 Table 1 reports the simple correlation coefficients between per capita GDP and 
the various indicators of the quality of human rights in each nation (nations with missing 
values for any human rights index were discarded for that particular correlation). The 
column labeled “N” denotes the number of observations used for each correlation. All of 
the results are statistically significant.14 
                                                                                                                                                 
13. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private 
business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized 
crime? 
14. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners and 
size of family? 
15. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on 
landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of 
legitimate economic gains? 
12Gerald O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes & Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2001 Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal: 2001). 
The Index includes a broad array of factors determining economic freedom: 
1. Corruption: in the judiciary, customs service and government bureaucracy 
2. Nontariff barriers to trade: such as import bans and quotas, as well as strict labeling and licensing 
requirements 
3. The fiscal burden of government: encompasses income tax rates, corporate tax rates and 
government expenditures as a percent of output 
4. The rule of law: efficiency within the judiciary, and the ability to enforce contracts 
5. Regulatory burdens: burdens on business, including health, safety and environmental regulation 
6. Restrictions on banks: regarding financial services, such as selling securities and insurance 
7. Labor market regulations: established work weeks and mandatory separation pay 
8. Black market activities: including smuggling, piracy of IP rights, the underground provision of 
labor and other services 
13Data were drawn from CIA World Factbook 2000, available online at 
www.ocdi.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
14In particular, if the various human rights indices are regressed in a simple regression on per capita 
GDP, the resulting coefficient of per capita GDP is statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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 Table 1 
Simple (Pearson) Correlations with 
Per Capita GDP  
 
        Corr. Coefficient   N  
Humana Rating  0.62  101 
Freedom House Political Rights Rating –0.44   193 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Rating –0.52   193 
WSJ Index of Economic Freedom –0.72   155 
Migration Rate  0.38   190 
 
Recalling that better human rights conditions are associated with higher values of the 
proxy for human rights in rows 1 and 5, and lower values of the proxy in rows 2-4, the 
results uniformly support the proposition that wealthier nations have better human rights 
conditions. The relationship holds whether the rights in question are predominantly 
economic, political or civil. These findings strongly suggest that policies which promote 
real income growth will also tend to promote human rights across a broad range of 
concerns. 
 We have already noted that open trade tends to increase real incomes, but at the 
risk of belaboring the point, it is perhaps instructive to look directly at the relationship 
between trade policy and human rights indices. The Index of Economic Freedom contains 
data by country on average tariff rates, which is a reasonably good measure of openness 
to trade at least in goods markets.15 Not surprisingly, a strong and statistically significant 
negative correlation arises between average tariff rates and per capita GDP (that is, more 
open nations tend to have higher GDP)—the correlation coefficient is -0.48. This 
relationship is explicable in part by the fact that more open countries tend to have higher 
growth rates, as noted earlier, and in part by the fact that over the history of the GATT 
fewer demands were made for trade concessions from developing countries.16  
                                                 
15Gerald O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes & Melanie Kirkpatrick, 2001 Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal: 2001). Nations with economies that are closed to imports 
were excluded from the sample in preference to assuming some extremely high average tariff rate. 
16See generally John Jackson, The World Trading System 2d ed. 319-25 (MIT: 1997). 
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  Because of the relationship between an open trading system and economic 
growth, we might expect that average tariff rates would also bear a clear, negative 
relationship to indicators of human rights (that is, lower average tariff rates tend to occur 
in nations with better human rights conditions). Table 2 reports the simple correlation 
between the average tariff rate and the various indicators of human rights employed 
above. 
 
Table 2 
Simple (Pearson) Correlations with 
Average Tariff Rate 
 
             Corr. Coefficient   N  
Humana Rating –0.60    94 
Freedom House Political Rights Rating  0.43   151 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Rating  0.44   151 
WSJ Index of Economic Freedom  0.54   148 
Migration Rate –0.20   151 
 
Again recall that better human rights conditions are associated with higher values of the 
proxy for human rights in rows 1 and 5, and lower values of the proxy in rows 2-4. Of 
course, a lower average tariff rate reflects greater openness to trade. Thus, greater 
openness to trade is correlated with better human rights conditions according to all of the 
indicators in Table 2. The results are statistically significant except for the one pertaining 
to the migration rate. 
 I do not want to make too much of these results. Simple correlations are hardly 
conclusive proof of a causal relationship between openness to trade and the overall 
quality of human rights—no doubt some of the causality runs the other way, and more 
sophisticated empirics are needed to sort out the true relationship. Moreover, even if 
openness to trade leads to improved human rights in general, exceptions may arise with 
respect to particular rights or countries. Nevertheless, there is certainly no basis for 
supposing either in theory or on the basis of available empirical information that a more 
open trading system does systematic damage to human rights in any broad sense. To the 
9 
 contrary, everything we know points to a generally favorable relationship between them, 
and the question then becomes how best to address the occasional tension that may arise. 
 
II. Trade, Human Rights and Policy Instruments 
 I will begin with some background on the imperfections of markets and of an 
open trading system. Economists usually discuss such imperfections using the language 
of “efficiency” and “distribution.”  
 Economic theory does not teach that the unfettered operation of open markets is 
always desirable. Among the conditions necessary for markets to work well is an absence 
of “non-pecuniary externalities,” defined as effects (favorable or unfavorable) on some 
individuals that do not pass through the price system resulting from the transactions of 
others individuals. The paradigm example is pollution—the transaction between a 
customer and a manufacturer, say, results in productive activity by the manufacturer that 
causes pollution which harms some third party. In the absence of non-pecuniary 
externalities, open competitive markets tend to be “Pareto efficient,” in the sense that no 
alternative allocation of resources can make someone better off without harming 
someone else.17 But as a practical matter, externalities such as pollution are a 
commonplace, and the possibility arises that corrective government intervention can 
enhance efficiency.  
 Moreover, economic theory has essentially nothing to say about distributional 
equity. Even if an economy is operating “efficiently,” the distribution of income may be 
unacceptably skewed by some criterion. Measures to redistribute income may be judged 
appropriate even though they often entail some efficiency loss. 
 It is well known in the international economics literature that open trade may 
create or exacerbate some problem associated with non-pecuniary externalities or with 
distributional equity. For example, a lowering of trade barriers may cause a nation to 
specialize in the production of some good with a production process that is quite “dirty,” 
resulting in a serious local pollution problem. Likewise, the “Stolper-Samuelson” 
theorem holds that the owners of inputs or “factors of production” that are used 
intensively in the production of goods that are displaced by imports when trade becomes 
                                                 
17This proposition is sometimes known as the first theorem of welfare economics. See Hal Varian, 
Microeconomic Analysis 3d ed. 323-26 (Norton: 1992). 
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 more open will tend to suffer reduced real income as a result (the owners of factors used 
intensively in exports will tend to enjoy increased real income).18 If workers in an 
import-competing industry are at the lower end of the income distribution at the outset, 
for example, more open trade may make them even worse off relative to other workers 
and the perceived equity of the income distribution may suffer. 
 Economic theory thus stipulates (the empirical importance of the problem is 
another matter) that more open trade may cause inefficiency or inequity in some contexts. 
Not all such effects will infringe “human rights,” but some of them may—commentators 
increasingly speak of “rights” to environmental quality, for example, and certainly a 
reduction in the real incomes of less fortunate individuals might be seen as interfering 
with certain “rights” to an adequate standard of living. 
 Might such possibilities justify interference with (or opposition to) more open 
trade? One answer is to be found in the preceding section—more open trade can 
contribute to overall improvement in human rights even if there are some more narrow 
tensions. Human rights advocates would be wise not to focus myopically on the negative 
aspects of open trade to the exclusion of its positive effects. 
 But there is a further response that builds on another important strand of 
economic literature. Consider first the case of the harmful non-pecuniary externality that 
is somehow exacerbated by more open trade—say, reciprocal tariff concessions have led 
some nation to specialize in an industry with high levels of pollution. An economist 
would say that manufacturers in the polluting industry do not bear the full social costs of 
their production if they are permitted to impose harms on others without paying for them. 
If those harmed by pollution have difficulty acting collectively to purchase relief,19 
theory then holds that the “first-best” device for dealing with the pollution externality is 
to intervene in a manner that raises the cost of the goods produced in the polluting 
industry to their true social cost, as by imposing a tax on the production of the good in 
question. After price is increased appropriately, no one will consume the good unless 
they are willing to bear its full social cost, including the cost of pollution, and the level of 
production will then be “efficient.”  
                                                 
18See, e.g., Peter Lindert, International Economics 9th ed. 73-77 (Irwin: 1991). 
19This is the mechanism explored by Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 
(1960). 
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  But what about dealing with the pollution problem through trade policy, as by 
retracting the reciprocal tariff concessions that led to the increase in pollution? Theory 
teaches that this response to the pollution problem is inferior. Even if it reduced pollution 
toward the appropriate level, it would do so at the cost of raising prices on other goods 
unconnected to pollution that were covered by the tariff concessions, and this would 
impose an additional efficiency loss on consumers. Direct intervention in the market that 
causes the pollution can correct the problem without causing such additional 
distortions.20 
 A similar line of reasoning applies to the problem of how best to correct for any 
harm to the income distribution caused by more open trade. When the distribution of 
income is unacceptable, one way to correct it is through progressive income taxes 
(including negative taxes [subsidies] for the poorest individuals if necessary). Such 
taxation has some cost to the overall level of output because it reduces work incentives. 
But imagine trying to achieve the same degree of redistribution through an alternative 
policy instrument such as trade policy (perhaps by rescinding the reciprocal trade 
concessions that led to reduced incomes for workers in import-competing industries). If 
the degree of income redistribution is the same as under the progressive tax system, then 
the adverse effect on work incentives should be the same. But efforts to correct the 
income distribution through trade policy impose a further cost by raising consumer prices 
and impeding efficient specialization of production in accordance with the principles of 
comparative advantage. Thus, progressive taxes produce fewer efficiency losses and are 
accordingly the “first-best” way to deal with income distribution problems. Restrictions 
on trade, like all other legal rules that cause further inefficiencies, are inferior.21 
 The general lesson is one about optimal policy instruments. Whatever the 
problem that arises, the best intervention will always deal with it at lowest cost. It is 
exceedingly unlikely that a problem connected to more open trade is best addressed by 
closing off trade and sacrificing its familiar benefits, rather than through some other 
policy instrument that directly addresses the problem in question. Even if a more open 
trading system at times collides with “human rights” in the estimation of some observers, 
                                                 
20See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Lectures on International Trade 185-91 (MIT: 1983). 
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 therefore, measures specifically and narrowly tailored to enhance the human rights at 
issue are more likely to be a cost effective solution than the much cruder device of 
interfering with open trade and the resulting allocation of productive resources.  
 
III. The WTO and Human Rights: Response to the Critics 
 In this section I will briefly offer an “economic” response to arguments noted in 
the introduction: the claim that WTO membership strips the world community of 
important sanctions against human rights violators; the notion that the growth of trade 
causes direct harms to the environment or to social conditions generally via a “race to the 
bottom;” and the suggestion that globalization is harmful because of its effects on income 
disparities. I also touch on the question whether intellectual property rights in 
pharmaceuticals are a threat to “human rights” in the developing world. 
 
A. The WTO, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights 
 Undeniably, the rules of the WTO system can interfere with the ability of its 
members to punish human rights violators by restricting trade with them. WTO members 
limit their capacity to exclude imports from other WTO members in accordance with 
“tariff bindings” in the goods area, and various “market access commitments” in the 
services area. Any trade restrictions in excess of these agreed limits, even in the name of 
human rights measures, would violate WTO law unless justified by some exception to the 
WTO rules, or by some superseding mutual agreement between the affected nations. As 
to the first possibility, although provisions such as Article XX of GATT (now part of the 
WTO agreements) provide some leeway for trade restrictions in the name of human 
rights, their scope is unclear and no doubt limited. And superseding agreements that 
allow trade sanctions between parties to a human rights dispute will be very rare. Thus, 
once a nation is admitted to the WTO, the ability of other WTO members to impose trade 
sanctions (legally) against that nation for human rights violations becomes more 
restricted.22  
                                                                                                                                                 
21This point is made in quite general terms in Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional 
Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 
Am. Econ. Rev. (Paps. & Procs.) 414 (1981). 
22Note that many of the targets of trade sanctions imposed in the past for political ends, such as Iraq, 
Iran and the Soviet Union, were not members of the GATT/WTO system at the time of the sanctions. 
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  That said, it is unclear to what extent the admission to the WTO of a nation 
accused of human rights abuses results in an important loss of external leverage. Recall 
the debate in the United States over most-favored nation status for China, and the 
argument of the U.S. administration that open commercial engagement will tend to 
improve human rights conditions over time. The information presented in Section I, 
indicating that wealthier and more open nations tend to have better human rights records 
on average, lends support to this claim. Likewise, policies aimed at isolating human 
rights violators and cutting them off from the prosperity that accompanies open trade may 
well cause human rights to deteriorate. 
 Further, it is questionable whether trade sanctions will be effective in promoting 
changes in human rights policy in the short term. Academic studies regarding the efficacy 
of sanctions for political purposes give them mixed reviews, indicating that sanctions 
often fail for a variety of reasons. The studies suggest, inter alia, that sanctions are most 
likely to be effective when they pertain to matters of modest importance, and when the 
sanction has the potential to inflict large losses on the target (such as a few percent of 
GDP).23 With such factors in mind, consider the problem of promoting human rights in 
China. Efforts to induce the government of China to dramatically alter its policies toward 
dissidents seek fundamental changes in the political system that probably cannot be 
viewed as “modest” under any plausible criterion. Likewise, it is unclear whether trade 
sanctions against China can succeed at imposing large losses on its economy—unless 
they are coordinated widely in a multilateral fashion, the nations that impose sanctions 
may simply see China divert its trade to other nations. 
 Finally, even if accession to the WTO causes an important loss of leverage over 
human rights matters in the view of some observers, the discussion in Section II above 
argues for a narrowly tailored response to the problem. The sensible response is not 
general opposition to the growth and expansion of the WTO, but an appropriate 
clarification or amendment of the rules governing exceptions to WTO obligations that 
would permit human rights sanctions under proper circumstances. I do not mean to 
advocate such changes, as I think it quite unclear whether the gains from relaxing the 
rules in this area would be worth the costs in the form of abuses and failed sanctions 
                                                 
23Perhaps the leading study is Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott & Kimberley Elliot, International 
Sanctions Reconsidered 2d ed. 91-115 (Inst. for Int’l Econ.: 1990). 
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 programs. But if an important tension really exists here, specific changes in rules and 
interpretation that better integrate WTO law with international human rights law are the 
better course.24 
 
B. Environment and “Race to the Bottom” Worries 
 Critics of the WTO commonly argue that open trade degrades the environment as 
business relocates to take advantage of lax environmental protection, and further places 
competitive pressures on environmental, labor, social and perhaps other standards with 
the result that regulators must sacrifice regulatory goals in these area in the interest of 
national competitiveness. Since many of these regulations touch on matters that some 
commentators view as “human rights,” some attention to them is required here. 
 Economic commentators are largely critical of such claims on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds.25 I begin with the theoretical objections. 
 The first emphasizes the essential lesson of Section I. Open trade increases real 
incomes on average, and nations with higher real incomes tend to spend more on the 
environment, on worker safety regulations, on social safety net programs, and so forth. 
The proposition that an open trading system will tend to reduce the average level of 
social protection in these areas is thus fundamentally at odds with the evidence that such 
standards are “normal goods” for the most part—interference with open trade is likely to 
damage human rights on average, not the reverse. 
 The second objection challenges the essential premise of the argument that open 
trade harms the environment (or other matters of social concern) when businesses 
relocate to take advantage of lower costs. If a business relocates, say, to a jurisdiction 
that permits more pollution, that phenomenon may well be desirable from an economic 
standpoint. The harm caused by a quantum of pollution is not the same everywhere: 
geographical differences across jurisdictions may make pollution less harmful in some 
places (air pollution is much more problematic in the Los Angeles basin, for example); 
differences in tastes or incomes may also make some societies more tolerant of pollution 
                                                 
24This is the general message in Petersmann, supra. 
25The literature is vast. Much of it is collected and referenced in the papers found in Unfair Trade and 
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, Vols. I & II, Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds. (MIT: 
1997) (hereafter Bhagwati & Hudec), and in a symposium issue of the Journal of Economic Law on 
regulatory competition, published in June 2000. 
15 
 than others. As a consequence, the social “shadow price” of pollution varies 
internationally, and it is perfectly appropriate for polluting businesses to locate where the 
social costs of pollution are lower. The argument is not limited to pollution. As one more 
(no doubt controversial) example, consider child labor. Where children have few 
opportunities for schooling and their families live in poverty, the opportunity to work 
may well leave them better off than otherwise. To the degree that a more open trading 
system makes possible greater levels of trade in products produced with child labor, 
affected children may benefit. Nothing here is meant to deny the sadness of children 
living in poverty with no access to schooling and poor access to the basics of life, but 
measures that interfere with their ability to work may leave them worse off yet.  
 The third theoretical objection relates to the policy instruments analysis of 
Section II. The fear of a “race to the bottom,” slightly rephrased, is a fear that 
governments will use lax regulatory policies as a means to attract capital to their 
jurisdiction.26 But that claim raises its own puzzle—why is capital valuable (at the 
margin) to the jurisdiction in question? Are the returns to additional capital due to the 
fact that capital is taxed in a manner that transfer rents from the owners of the new capital 
to the citizens of the jurisdiction? If not, what is the incentive to attract more capital? If 
capital is valuable at the margin because of the tax system, why would governments not 
use the tax system to attract more capital (as through subsidies to new business)? Is that 
not a more likely way for jurisdictions to attract capital than through suboptimal 
regulatory policies that sacrifice the environment, the interests of workers, or something 
else of value? 
 One response is that the regulatory policy in question is expressly redistributive—
government has chosen to tax capital for the purpose of redistributing income, and capital 
mobility in an open trading system makes it much harder to pursue this policy over the 
long run.27 A reduction in taxes can of course mitigate capital flight in this scenario, but it 
comes at the expense of the redistributive program in question (or creates the need for a 
different kind of tax to finance it). With the addition of this insight, the more plausible 
                                                 
26See John Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for 
the Race to the Bottom?, in Bhagwati & Hudec vol. 1, supra. 
27This is the essence of the distinction between efficiency-enhancing and redistributive policies in 
David Charny, Regulatory Competition and the Global Coordination of Labor Standards, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
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 and precise “race to the bottom” claim becomes one about the long-run difficulties of 
redistributing income from the owners of mobile factors of production in an open 
economy to the owners of immobile factors.  
 It is not entirely clear, however, why redistribution needs to proceed in this 
fashion. If the goal is to aid the poor, for example, taxes on the labor or landholdings of 
the wealthy may suffice to raise the needed funds. Hence, the pressure that an open 
trading system places on established programs of redistribution may be a largely 
transitory problem that simply requires appropriate adjustments in tax policy. 
 The fourth line of criticism is closely related. Any inefficient harm to the 
environment from the growth of trade (putting global commons issues to one side) or any 
more general “race to the bottom” results from a failure of national political systems to 
employ proper tools to address social problems. Indeed, the essence of the race to the 
bottom claim is that domestic regulators will deviate from optimal regulation due to 
competitive pressures. But if regulators are inclined to deviate from optimal regulation 
under those circumstances, what reason is there to believe that they would engage in 
optimal regulation under any circumstances? Put differently, if the concern is that interest 
group politics distorts regulatory decisions, what reason is there to believe that the 
distortion will systematically run in the direction of under-regulation in an open trading 
system? Chicago school economists such as George Stigler and Sam Peltzman have made 
enormous contributions to the theory of regulation which suggest that much regulation is 
excessive and unproductive, a result of capture by regulated entities.28 The same point is 
made by those on the other side of the political spectrum, and environmental regulation 
in particular hardly escapes condemnation.29  Once domestic regulatory policies are seen 
in their true light—as the highly imperfect product of an interaction among self-interested 
interest groups—the fact that they may come under pressure in an open trading system 
need not be unfortunate. International regulatory competition may well drive out foolish 
and wasteful regulations rather than undermine valuable regulations.30 
                                                                                                                                                 
281 (2000), as well as the point of departure for Dani Rodrik in Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Inst. for 
Int’l Econ.: 1997). 
28E.g., Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug 
Amendments, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 1049 (1973). 
29E.g., Bruce Ackerman & William Hassler, Clean Coal: Dirty Air (Yale: 1981). 
30See generally the symposium in Journal of International Economic Law, June, 2000. 
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  The fifth line of theoretical criticism concerns the question of whether there exists 
any practical, superior alternative to regulatory competition in an open trading system. 
Economic commentators agree that nations should differ in the degree to which they 
regulate in various areas due to differences in tastes, incomes, geography and other 
factors. Accordingly, harmonization of regulatory standards is quite undesirable in 
general.31 And to the suggestion that international cooperation ought to at least place a 
“floor” under the level of regulation on many subjects, the response is that there is little 
reason to trust cooperation to produce an appropriate floor. In the area of labor and 
environmental standards, for example, the great fear of developing nations is that any 
international floor on such standards will be driven by protectionist interest groups in the 
developed countries seeking to raise the costs of their developing country rivals—
precisely that fear is said by many to have produced the unraveling of the WTO 
ministerial meeting in Seattle. 
 The final line of attack on the race to the bottom and related claims is not 
theoretical, but empirical. The bulk of the investigation done in this area pertains to 
environmental regulations, and searches for one of two things: direct evidence that more 
open trade has been followed by a lowering of environmental standards, or evidence that 
businesses relocate to jurisdictions with lax environmental regulations following trade 
liberalization. In general, empirical evidence of such phenomena is scant: “The literature 
surveyed is almost unanimous in its conclusion that environmental regulations have not 
affected interjurisdictional trade or the location decisions of manufacturers. Where 
studies have found statistically significant effects of such regulations, the effects are 
always quite small.”32 None of this is meant to deny that some environmental problems 
may cross jurisdictional boundaries, and that international cooperation can be needed to 
address them. But the notion that the growth of world trade has precipitated a noticeable 
decline in the domestic environmental standards of trading nations is not supported by 
the available evidence. 
 No doubt more empirical work remains to be done, and perhaps the picture for 
policies other than environmental standards will ultimately look rather different. Indeed, 
                                                 
31Again, see generally sources cited in note 25 supra. 
32Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic 
Evidence, in Bhagwati & Hudec, Vol. I, supra, p. 450. 
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 as noted above, some commentators do believe that a more open trading system has put 
serious pressure on certain redistributive policies that in the past have been supported by 
capital taxes. It is perhaps in this domain that any “race to the bottom” is likely to 
manifest itself, and to impinge on important “human rights” concerns. But the magnitude 
of the problem remains unclear, and the ability of governments to substitute alternative 
methods of redistribution that are not threatened by capital mobility may largely 
ameliorate it. 
 
C. Income Disparities 
  Recent decades have brought widening income inequality in many nations.33 
Some commentators link the problem to growing trade, and view it as a basis for resisting 
the growth of the WTO or other “globalization” initiatives. 
 To be sure, some of the increased income inequality may be due to more open 
trade. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, noted earlier, predicts declining real incomes for 
factors of production dedicated to the import-competing industries harmed by growth in 
trade. To the degree that the affected entities are workers already toward the lower end of 
the income distribution (perhaps textile workers in developed countries, as an example), 
deepening income inequality is surely a possibility. 
 It hardly follows, however, that resistance to further growth in trade is a sensible 
response. Much of the increase in income inequality is likely due to other factors. The 
returns to education have been rising generally,34 and lower skilled workers are being left 
behind across the board regardless of their industry. The reason why is something of an 
economic puzzle, but the general view is that technological progress in modern times 
favors skilled workers.35 The empirical evidence on the relationship between trade and 
                                                 
33Some of the inequality literature is cited in Dunoff, supra. See also Burtless, C., International trade 
and the rise in earnings inequality, 33 J. Econ. Lit. 800 (1995). 
34See Gordon Hanson, The Globalization of Production, NBER Reporter, March 22, 2001, p.12; 
Murnane, R. J., and Levy, F., Why today’s high-school-educated males earn less than their fathers did: The 
problem and an assessment of responses. 63 Harv. Ed. Rev. 1 (1993). 
35Galor, O., and Moav, O., Ability-biased technological transition, wage inequality, and economic 
growth. 115 Q.J. Econ. 469 (2000). 
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 wages also tends to find rather little downward pressure on any category of wages from 
the growth of trade.36 The primary reasons for widening inequality likely lie elsewhere. 
 Moreover, as noted, open trade promotes the growth of real incomes on average 
even if some individuals suffer. When the growth of trade harms particular groups of 
citizens to a degree that is troubling, policies that interfere with trade and reduce overall 
national income are an unnecessarily costly way of dealing with the problem. Returning 
to the earlier discussion of optimal policy instruments, transfer programs for the needy 
would be a superior corrective. And if trade-related harms are for some reason deemed 
worthy of special attention, transfer programs targeted at trade-related harms to groups of 
workers (such as the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program under U.S. law)37 can be 
employed. 
 This last point raises a broader issue. Income inequality arises for many reasons 
that have nothing to do with trade, and it is hardly clear that the proper response to 
income inequality in any way turns on its genesis. Perhaps all that is needed is a sensible 
network of need-based transfer and safety net programs—once in place, they can address 
troubling income inequalities whatever their source. And against a backdrop of sensible 
transfer and safety net measures, open trade can only improve matters by increasing 
national income and making assistance to the needy more affordable. 
 
 D. TRIPS and the Developing World 
 Although trade liberalization lies at the heart of the WTO agenda and its 
predecessor the GATT, other matters now come within the WTO system. The most 
important to date is intellectual property. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires WTO members to establish 
effective protection for patents, trademarks, copyrights and other types of intellectual 
property. It includes detailed rules about the rights that must be protected as well as many 
of the procedures for protecting them. 
                                                 
36Robert Lawrence and Matthew Slaughter, International trade and American wages in the 1980s: 
giant sucking sound or small hiccup? 1993 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 161; Edward Leamer, 
In search of Stolper-Samuelson effects on US wages, NBER Working Paper, no 5427, January 1998; 
Kevin Murphy and Finis Welch, F., The role of international trade in wage differentials, in Workers and 
their wages: Changing patterns in the United States, M. H. Kosters editor, 39-76. (AEI: 1991). 
37See 19 U.S.C. §§2271-2394. 
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  One consequence of TRIPS has been tan effort in developing countries to create 
or enhance patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The consequences of this effort for the 
price and availability of medicines in developing countries has been the subject of 
considerable attention lately, particularly with respect to the AIDS epidemic in sub-
Saharan Africa. Legislation alleged to be inconsistent with TRIPS was the subject of 
recent litigation in South Africa in a case brought by manufacturers of AIDS 
medications, a case that eventually was dropped.38 Many commentators have plainly been 
troubled by the notion that the intellectual property laws required by TRIPS might be 
used to raise the price or restrict the availability of medications under the desperate 
circumstances that confront many sub-Saharan nations,39 and this aspect of the WTO 
system has been attacked as a particular source of tension with human rights—here, basic 
rights to medical care.40 
 Economists have something to contribute to this set of issues, but to some degree 
can merely point out that the wisdom of the various policy options turns on thorny 
empirical issues. To be sure, economists generally believe that some degree of 
intellectual property protection is essential to provide innovators with proper incentives 
to create new ideas and to market them. But there is no consensus on the details of an 
optimal intellectual property system, such as optimal patent length or scope. Accordingly, 
we cannot be confident that the rules contained in TRIPS enhance economic welfare 
relative to the set of national rules that would prevail in its absence, or relative to some 
other hypothetical multilateral agreement.  
 With respect to pharmaceuticals in particular, no one can say for certain whether 
existing rules governing pharmaceutical patents afford inadequate protection (suboptimal 
incentives to innovate) or excessive protection (excessive periods of monopoly pricing 
relative to what is necessary to encourage innovation). Some studies suggest that the 
social returns to pharmaceutical innovation are exceedingly high and that more 
investment in R&D is needed.41 Commentators skeptical of that view point to the high 
                                                 
38South Africa Settles Patent Dispute with Drug Industry, 14 AIDS Litigation Reporter No. 18, p. 6 
(June 18,2001). 
39EU/WTO: Promise to Address Medicine for Poor Countries, European Report, June 27, 2001. 
40The right to the highest attainable level of physical and mental health has long been among the 
rights recognized in the UN covenants. 
41Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, forthcoming in Journal of Law and Economics. 
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 profitability of the industry, to the billions of dollars that can be made from a successful 
new drug before generic entry occurs, and to the limited supply of human capital 
available for productive research. In the end, one can neither prove nor refute the 
possibility that patent rights in pharmaceuticals create excessive rents for pharmaceutical 
companies, and that some reduction in patent protection might be socially productive. If 
so, then the relaxation of pharmaceutical patent protection in developing countries might 
seem a particularly attractive option given the humanitarian concerns. 
 In addition, it is unclear how much patent protection in developing countries 
affects the overall incentives of pharmaceutical companies to conduct research and 
development. International price discrimination is common in pharmaceuticals, with 
dramatically lower prices on drugs sold to many developing countries. It is possible that 
revenues from developing country sales for many types of drugs are quite a small portion 
of total revenues presently. The impact of reduced intellectual property protection in 
developing countries on the returns to pharmaceutical R&D might then be small as well, 
especially if generic medications sold in developing country markets could be kept out of 
major developed markets.  
 Further, even if a reduction in patent protection for pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries would come at the cost of an important, uneconomical reduction in incentives 
to innovate, it is possible to imagine devices that would make pharmaceuticals more 
affordable in developing country markets without affecting incentives to innovate. The 
most obvious mechanism is direct transfers from the governments of developed nations 
to help fund pharmaceutical purchases in the developing world—the recent G-8 
commitments regarding AIDS drugs are illustrative.42  
 But this discussion requires an important caveat. The AIDS pandemic is not the 
only infectious disease problem in the developing world—malaria, drug-resistant 
tuberculosis, and sleeping sickness are among the other notable killers. And unlike AIDS, 
these diseases are found primarily in developing countries. Little research is being 
undertaken on these diseases, presumably because pharmaceutical companies do not 
anticipate returns that would justify the cost. The TRIPS agreement might have some 
                                                 
42See Launch of Global AIDS Fund at G-8 Summit Gets Mixed Reviews, Africa News, July 24, 2001. 
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 potential to change this situation if pharmaceutical manufacturers perceived that it would 
create credible patent rights in the developing economies.  
 Yet, the political pressure has been to weaken TRIPs, and of course the DOHA 
ministerial meeting of the WTO produced a Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and 
Public Health that opens the door wider to the use of compulsory licensing in response to 
national medical emergencies, and affirms the right of nations to permit parallel imports 
(which undercuts international price discrimination by pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
Although such policies can have the salutary impact of making existing drugs more 
affordable to those who desperately need them, their prospect may greatly diminish any 
hope that TRIPs might stimulate new research on tropical diseases.43 
  
Conclusion 
 The opponents of globalization and the WTO point to a wide array of concerns, 
only some of which can fairly be said to implicate human rights. Economists will find 
little merit in most of the human rights critique (like most of the other objections to trade 
and globalization), and indeed the evidence suggests that the growth of the trading 
system generally tends to promote rather than undermine human rights. Any tensions are 
best resolved through tailored interventions that directly address the human rights 
impairment without sacrificing the wider benefits of freer trade. 
 
                                                 
43 I address these issues at considerable length in another recent paper: TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, 
Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 47 (2002). Similar observations may be 
found in Jean O. Lanjouw, A Patent Policy for Global Diseases: U.S. and International Legal Issues, 
forthcoming in Harvard Journal of Law and Technology (Fall 2002). Lanjouw proposes in essence a two-
tier system of patent rights that would provide strong patent protection in developing countries for 
medicines that address tropical diseases, but would weaken patent protection in developing countries for 
other medicines. 
23 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Alan O. Sykes 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 Alan_Sykes@law.uchicago.edu 
 
 
 
24 
 Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
1. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other 
Unpublished Works:  An Economic Approach (July 1991) 
2. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of 
Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991) 
3. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September 1991) 
4. Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February 1992) 
5. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools (February 
1992) 
6. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of AIDS (April 1992) 
7. Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992) 
8. William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July 
1992) 
9. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A 
Quantitative Study (August 1992) 
10. Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical 
Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September 1992) 
11. Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts (November 1992) 
12. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January 1993) 
13. J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning 
Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993) 
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (April 1993) 
15. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everyone Else Does) (April 1993) 
16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial 
Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital (August 1993) 
17. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the 
Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993) 
18. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory 
Adjudication (September 1993) 
19. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (September 1993) 
20. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis (October 1993) 
21. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle (March 1994) 
22. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law (June 1994) 
23. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis (June 1994) 
24. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan 
(August 1994) 
25. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (August 1994) 
26. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property 
Protection of Software (August 1994) 
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994) 
25 
 28. David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (December 
1994) 
29. Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime 
Consumption (January 1995) 
30. Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages (February 1995) 
31. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Explaining Deviations 
from the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation (March 1995) 
32. Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business 
Enterprise (April 1995) 
33. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995) 
34. J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995) 
35. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology 
(November 1995) 
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January 1996) 
37. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law 
Regimes: Econometrics from Japan (January 1996) 
38. Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences 
Make Good Neighbors? (March 1996) 
39. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996) 
40. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes 
Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles (July 1996) 
41. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry 
Concealed Handguns (August 1996) 
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996) 
43. G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and 
Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (March 1997) 
44. Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March 1997) 
45. William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay 
(March 1997) 
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997) 
47. John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: 
Evidence from California=s State Legislative Races (May 1997) 
48. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to 
the Adoption of Norms (June 1997) 
49. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through 
the Lens of Laissez-Faire (August 1997)  
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive 
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (December 1997)  
51. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: 
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998)  
52. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are 
Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger (February 1998)  
26 
 53.  Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic 
Analysis of Law (March 1998)  
54. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998)  
55. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics (May 1998) 
56. John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action, 
Police Departments, and Crime (May 1998) 
57. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (June 
1998) 
58. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determinants, 
Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional 
Attempts to Limit Awards (July 1998) 
59. Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August 1998) 
60. John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women=s Suffrage Change the Size and 
Scope of Government? (September 1998) 
61. Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 
1998) 
62. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law 
(November 1998) 
63. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law 
(November 1998) 
64. John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December 
1998) 
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A 
AThird Way@ (January 1999) 
66. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February 
1999) 
67. Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods 
(February 1999) 
68. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February 
1999) 
69. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with 
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999) 
70. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999) 
71. Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine, Environmental 
Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999) 
72. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 
1999) 
73. John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shooting, 
Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private 
and Public Law Enforcement (April 1999)  
74. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2=s Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study (May 1999) 
27 
 75. Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again 
(May 1999) 
76. William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz 
Collection (May 1999) 
77. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want 
Optimal Deterrence? (June 1999) 
78. Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a 
Function of Technological Change (June 1999) 
79. David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999) 
80. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error (August 1999) 
81. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic 
than Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September 
1999) 
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999) 
83. Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Law and Economics (September 1999) 
84. Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel (October 1999) 
85. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 1999) 
86. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal 
Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October 
1999) 
87. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal 
Characteristics (November 1999) 
88. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted (November 1999) 
89. Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and 
Satire (November 1999) 
90. David A. Weisbach, Should the Tax Law Require Current Accrual of Interest on 
Derivative Financial Instruments? (December 1999) 
91. Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999) 
92. Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000) 
93. Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and 
Complexity in Contracts (January 2000)  
94. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd=s Legacy and Blackstone=s 
Ghost (February 2000)  
95. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars: 
The Severity Shift (February 2000) 
96. Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with 
Special Reference to Sanctions (March 2000) 
97. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies (April 
2000)  
28 
 98. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May 
2000) 
99. David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Laws (May 
2000, revised May 2002)  
100. Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work (June 2000)  
101. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000) 
102. Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative 
Position (August 2000)  
103. Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions (September 2000)  
104. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (October 2000)  
105. Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes,  The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Internet (November 2000) 
106. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (November 2000) 
107. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the 
Patent System (November 2000) 
108. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International 
Relations:  A Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000) 
109. William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000) 
110. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000) 
111. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December 
2000) 
112. Richard A. Epstein and Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious 
Liability, Class Actions and the Patient=s Bill of Rights (December 2000) 
113. William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art:  An 
Economic Approach (December 2000) 
114. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule (January 2001) 
115. George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital 
(January 2001) 
116. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (February 2001) 
117. Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer 
Finance (February 2001) 
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Fads and Fashions (with Special Reference to Law) 
(March 2001) 
119. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis:  A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective (April 2001) 
120. Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale?  Rights of Publicity in the Digital 
Age (April 2001) 
121. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and 
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganization (April 2001) 
122. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters (May 2001) 
123. William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished? 
(May 2001) 
124. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights?  Lessons from South Africa (May 
2001) 
29 
 125. Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, The 
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks (June 2001)   
126. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making (June 
2001) 
127. Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks after ATA (June 2001) 
128.   Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear (June 2001) 
129. Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution:  The Hidden Perils of Property 
Transfer (July 2001) 
130. Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft:  The Declining Need for 
Centralized Coordination in a Networked World (July 2001) 
131. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments (July 2001) 
132. Eric A. Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts (August 2001) 
133. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions (August 2001) 
134. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons:Parking and Stopping on the 
Commons (August 2001) 
135. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (September 2001) 
136. Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of 
Property Exemption Laws (September 2001) 
137. Eric A. Posner and George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an 
Incomplete Contracts Perspective (September 2001) 
138. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emptions, Worst Cases, and Law 
(November 2001) 
139. Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Throwing Good Money after Bad? 
Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending (December 2001) 
140. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
ASolution@ (February 2002) 
141. Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation 
(February 2002) 
142. Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in 
Compaq v. Commissioner (February 2002) (Published in Tax Notes, January 28, 
2002) 
143. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (March 2002, Journal of Legal 
Studies 2002) 
144. Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy:  Its Unintended and Intended 
Consequences (March 2002, forthcoming Cato Journal, summer 2002) 
145. David A. Weisbach, Thinking Ouside the Little Boxes (March 2002, Texas Law 
Review) 
146. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:  Success 
or Failure (March 2002) 
147. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy:  The Case of Digital Distribution 
(April 2002, The Antitrust Bulletin) 
30 
 148. David A. Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (April 2002, 
Coase Lecture February 2002) 
149. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (April 2002) 
150. Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 2002) 
151. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (May 2002, updated January 
2003) 
152. Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (May 
2002) 
153. Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:  
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002) 
154. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright 
(July 2002) 
155. Anne Gron and Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the 
Government as Insurer? (July 2002) 
156. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 
2002) 
157.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002) 
158. Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law (with 
Notes on Interpretive Theory) (August 2002) 
159. Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent 
and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright (September 2002) 
160. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War (September 2002) 
161 Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for 
Tort and Contract Law (September 2002) 
162. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks (September 2002) 
163. David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot? (September 2002) 
164. Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (September 2002) 
165. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (October 2002) 
166. Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief (October 
2002) 
167. Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom (November 2002) 
168. Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget 
(November 2002) 
169. Avraham D. Tabbach, Criminal Behavior, Sanctions, and Income Taxation: An 
Economic Analysis (November 2002) 
170. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of “Old” Public Health: The Legal Framework for 
the Regulation of Public Health (December 2002) 
171. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (December 2002) 
172. David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates 
(December 2002) 
173. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy (December 
2002) 
31 
 32 
174. Richard A. Epstein, Into the Frying Pan: Standing and Privity under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Beyond (December 2002) 
175. Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003) 
176. David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of 
Short-Term Assets (January 2003) 
177. Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come 
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act? (January 2003) 
178. Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecom-
munications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon (January 2003) 
179. William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright 
Infringement: An Economic Perspective (February 2003) 
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003) 
181. Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003) 
182. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion 
(April 2003) 
183. Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 
2003) 
184. Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003) 
185. Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an 
Oxymoron (May 2003) 
186. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (May 2003) 
187. Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 
2003) 
188. Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective 
(May 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
